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Tamer Balcı

The Cyprus Crisis and the Southern Flank of NATO (19601975) 1
Tamer Balci 2
Abstract: Independence of Cyprus in 1960 ended neither the Greek demand to
annex the island to Greece, nor the Turkish demand to divide the island along
the ethnic lines. This paper analyzes the policies of major actors on the Cyprus
problem in its crucial years from 1960 to 1975. An overall examination of the
British, Turkish, Greek, American and the Soviet policies on Cyprus along
with the policies of the Turkish and Greek Cypriots in this period reveals that
all sides except Greece developed alternative policies and proposals to solve
the problem. Greece was the only side that did not abandon its Cyprus policy
of enosis, union with Greece. The unaccommodating approach of Greece on
the Cyprus issue not only paved the road for the end of Greek junta (19671974) but also for the eventual collapse of southern flank of NATO in 1975.
By 1975, Greece left NATO and Turkey suffered the arms embargo of its NATO
ally, the United States of America and in response it shut down the majority of
American military bases in Turkey and further weakened the southern flank
of NATO.
Keywords: Cyprus, NATO, Cypriots, Turkey, Greece, Enosis, Akritas plan,
AKEL,
Introduction
The island of Cyprus occupies one of the most strategically significant locations
in the Eastern Mediterranean. As the age of decolonization started, after a
five-year negotiation process the former British colony of Cyprus became an
independent state in 1960 alas the conflict was not resolved. Considering
Greece’s long-standing demand for enosis, union of Cyprus with Greece, on
the one side, and Turkey’s concerns for the security of the Turkish population
on the island, on the other, brought two NATO allies to the threshold of a war
during the Cold War. This paper examines the Cyprus problem from 1960 to
1975 and the policies of major powers on the problem. I argue that from 1960
to 1975 Turkey, Britain, and two superpowers United States and the Soviet
Union as well as the Greek and Turkish Cypriot leaders developed various

1 An earlier version of this paper was presented at the Cold War Cultures Conference at the University
of Texas-Austin, Austin, TX, on September 30-October 3, 2010.
2 Tamer Balci, Assistant Professor of History, University of Texas-Pan American, Department of History
and Philosophy
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policies on Cyprus that served the best of their as well as the Cypriots’
interests. In this time period, Greece was the only side that never adopted a
different policy than enosis. Greece neither considered an alternative policy
on Cyprus nor offered an accommodating solution to address the concerns of
the Turkish Cypriots, such as granting equal citizenship rights to Turks on the
island instead of minority rights.
Initially, Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots opposed the Greek enosis proposal
and alternatively proposed taksim, division of Cyprus between Turkey and
Greece. Turkish policy changed after 1964 as Turkey and Turkish Cypriots
regarded a federal state as a viable solution to the problem. Nevertheless,
the Greek Cypriot unwillingness to grant equal citizenship rights to the Turks
on the island left this offer futile despite the explicit Soviet support for a
federal solution. While Greece insisted on enosis, by the mid-1960s the Greek
Cypriot leadership favored an independent Cyprus instead of enosis and thus
was targeted by Greece. After securing a military base in south Cyprus,
Britain gradually left the burden of diplomatic meddling to the US despite the
American reluctance for engagement.
The primary concern for the US was the security of the southern flank of
NATO. New Cyprus republic took its place among the non-aligned countries.
This situation created a fertile atmosphere for the Soviet influence on the
island. In order to prevent any Soviet involvement on the island, the US
initially stayed aside and expected Britain to resolve the issue diplomatically.
The US intervened in 1964 when the problem turned into a direct threat to
the security of NATO. By 1964 the constitutional authority of Cyprus republic
was dissolved. The foundation treaties of Cyprus allowed Turkey, Greece and
Britain to intervene militarily in case the agreed terms were altered without
the consent of the signatories. Appealing to this clause, Turkey planned to
intervene on the island in 1964 but the US strongly warned Turkey not to do
so. In his letter to Turkish Prime Minister İsmet İnönü, US President Lyndon
B. Johnson stated that if a Turkish intervention into Cyprus caused a Soviet
attack against Turkey, Turkey’s NATO allies might not come to its aid. Also,
Johnson warned İnönü that Turkey was not allowed to use US arms for nonNATO purposes. The letter turned Turkish-American relations upside down
and marked the beginning of an unfriendly era between two countries. Taking
advantage of this political climate, the Turkish left successfully rallied masses
toward anti-Americanism in Turkey.
It is against this background that the role of the US in the Cyprus issue took
on a new significance. The US policy on Cyprus failed because of three main
reasons: first amid all the turmoil of Cold War, the US intervened only after
the conflict became a direct threat to the unity of NATO but it was too late
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too little. Second, the US policy makers ignored the democratic voice of the
people in Greece and Turkey by supporting military regimes. Third, the US
policy was under the heavy influence of a Greek lobby that prioritized the
Greek interests over the US interests. Consequently, the same policies caused
the collapse of the southern flank of NATO.
As opposed to the US, the Soviets took their steps cautiously and reached their
objectives by 1975. The best organized party in Cyprus was the communist
party. The Soviets let the Cyprus Communist Party (AKEL) voice the communist
agenda. The Soviets were open to any solution that left Cyprus an independent
state so that Cyprus did not become a NATO entity. Thus, the Soviets were
against both Greek enosis, union with Greece, and Turkish taksim, division,
policy.
Next time another crisis started in Cyprus in 1974, resented Turks ignored
the US and launched a unilateral military operation. Turkey reached its goal
of preventing enosis and gained an upper hand in the conflict. As a result,
the pro-American Greek junta fell in Greece and Greece pulled out of NATO
alas the enosis policy of Greece on Cyprus remained unchanged. Soon Turkey
faced a US arms embargo and it retaliated by shutting down non-NATO US
military bases in Turkey. By 1975, the southern flank of NATO was weaker
than ever.
The Roots of the Cyprus Conflict
The Cyprus problem started in the mid 1950s when Cyprus was a British
colony. Cyprus was under British control since 1878. Britain rented the island
from the Ottoman Empire in 1878 and annexed it in November 1914 when the
Ottoman Empire joined WWI on the side of Germany. After the war, the article
16 of the Lausanne Treaty (1923), stated that should Britain decide to leave
Cyprus, the future of the island would be determined by Turkey and Britain. 3
The article 16 allowed Turkey to have a voice in the future of Cyprus.
As the decolonization started after WWII, Britain was initially willing to leave
Cyprus. As the Cold War brought a new communist threat to the Middle East
and Israel gained independence in 1948, Britain reevaluated the evacuation
of Cyprus as it desperately needed a strategic military base in the Middle
East. Consequently, in the 1950s Britain made Cyprus its military center in
the region. The only problem was that the island lacked a natural port. Since
building a port would be too expensive, Britain first built only a military airport
and a base on Cyprus. During the Suez Crisis in 1956, Britain understood the

3 Ahmet Yavuz, TC’nin Andlaşmaları I, (Ankara: The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1992) 23.
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strategic significance of Cyprus in the eastern Mediterranean. Since Cyprus
did not have a port, Britain had to receive support from Malta, 1,000 miles
away from the Suez Canal.
During the British colonial administration, Greece several times asked Britain
to allow Greece to annex Cyprus. The United Nations’ declaration supporting
the right to self-determination for every nation was a great opportunity for
the Greek population of Cyprus. But Greeks were not the only nation on the
island. Turkish Cypriots, who made up 30 percent of the island population,
formed another nation in Cyprus. The British unwillingness to give up Cyprus
attracted the fury of the Greek militant organization (EOKA) 4, which targeted
not only the British authorities but also Turkish Cypriots because of their
support for the British. The Greek Cypriot violence pushed Britain to the
negotiation table after 1955. As agreed in the Lausanne Treaty, Turkey became
one of the parties in the negotiations. During the negotiations Greece and
Greek Cypriot policy was enosis, annexation of island to Greece, while Turkey
pursued a taksim, partition policy that aimed to divide the island between
Turkey and Greece.
Eventually Cyprus achieved its independence on August 16, 1960 and it
became a joint state of Turkish and Greek Cypriots. The London and Zurich
Treaties, 5 which served as the basis of Cyprus constitution, created a shared
governance of Greek and Turkish Cypriots with Turkish and Greek as official
languages. According to the foundation treaties, president and vice president
of the Cyprus Republic were to be a Greek and a Turkish Cypriot respectively.
Both president and vice president were granted veto rights over the decisions
of Ministers of Council that included seven Greek and three Turkish Cypriots.
Similarly seventy percent of the parliament seats were reserved for Greek
Cypriots while Turkish Cypriots were to receive the thirty percent of parliament
seats. Likewise, civil service positions as well as security forces were to be
divided proportionally. Furthermore, a constitutional court was created for
the disputes. The court had to have a Greek, a Turkish and a neutral member.
The neutral member had to be the president of the constitutional court.
Furthermore, the article 22 of the treaties clearly prohibited both the Greek
goal of enosis and Turkish goal of taksim, partition. In the agreement, Britain
secured two military bases on the island. Together with Britain, Greece
and Turkey became guarantor powers of the new Cyprus Republic. They
were authorized to intervene in the island in case the agreed constitutional

4 Ethniki Organosis Kiprion Agoniston (National Organization of Cypriot Fighters).
5 Murat Metin Hakki, edt., The Cyprus Issue, A Documentary History, 1878-2007, (London: I. B. Tauris,
2007) 31-39.
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authority was disrupted. The 1960 Cyprus Constitution was drafted based
on the outlines listed in the foundation treaties 6 Greek Cypriots considered
the independence as a step toward enosis. 7 The independence removed the
British obstacle. The next target was the Turkish community. The Greek
Cypriots were not satisfied with the Cyprus constitution. The constitution,
according to the Greek president of Cyprus, Archbishop Makarios 8, gave too
many rights to the Turkish population. Makarios was not willing to give more
than minority rights to the Turkish Cypriots. By violating the constitution,
he refused to give civil service positions to Turkish Cypriots and subdued the
Constitutional Court. Under the pressure and threats from Greek Cypriots,
on May 21, 1963, the president of the Supreme Constitutional Court, Ernst
Forsthoff and his assistant resigned from their posts. 9
Makarios presented a thirteen-point constitutional amendment proposal
to Turkish vice president Fazıl Küçük on November 30, 1963. Makarios
proposed to remove the veto power of Turkish vice president, proportional
representation of civil officers and security forces. 10 He also wanted to remove
the guarantee agreements from the constitution. Since these changes would
reduce the Turkish Cypriots to a minority position, both Küçük and the Turkish
government refused them. In December 1963, Makarios declared that he did
not recognize the guarantee treaties.
Soon after Makarios’ declaration, organized attacks against the Turkish
Cypriots started. Despite the pleas of the Turkish vice president, Fazıl Küçük,
there was no Cypriot state attempt to stop the violence against the Turkish
civilians. In fact, the attacks against Turkish Cypriots were organized by
Greek Cypriot authorities. Thus, Turkish Cypriots organized in the (TMT) Türk
Mukavemet Teşkilatı, Turkish Resistance Organization. The atrocities against
Turkish Cypriots turned into a massacre on December 24, 1963. In the last

6 Ibid., 41-87.
7 Abdulhaluk Çay, Kıbrıs’ta Kanlı Noel–1963, (Ankara: Türk Kültürünü Araştırma Enstitüsü Yayınları,
1989) 44-45.
8 On March 9, 1956, Cyprus’ British Governor Harding exiled Makarios to the Schelles islands in the
Indian Ocean because of his active role in EOKA activities. In fact, the Orthodox Archbishop played
important role in organizing EOKA. He even had a code name, Haris, in EOKA. Kıbrıs Gerçeği’nin
Bilinmeyen Yönleri, (Istanbul: INAF 1992) 46.
9 Pierre Oberling, The Road to Bellapais: The Turkish Cypriot Exodus to Northern Cyprus, (New York:
Columbia University Press, 1982) 79.
10 For the full text of Makarios’ 13-point proposal see Hakki, 89-90.
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week of December 1963, more than 300 Turkish Cypriots were killed. 11 The
annihilation plan took its name from a nineteenth century Byzantium legend,
Akritas. The engineer of the Akritas plan 12 was the interior minister of the
Cyprus Republic, Polikarpos Yorgacis. At the end of the Akritas plan, Yorgacis
used the name Akritas instead of his name.

“It is estimated that we have better chances of succeeding in
our efforts to influence international public opinion in our favor
if we present our demand, as we did during the struggle, as a
demand to exercise the right of self-determination, rather than
as a demand for union with Greece (Enosis)….In the event of
instinctive violent Turkish reactions, if our counter attacks are
not immediate, we run the risk effacing panic in the Greeks in the
towns and thus loosing substantial vital areas, while, on the other
hand, an immediate show of our strength may bring the Turks to
their senses and confine their actions to sporadic insignificant
acts, …effective use of force dealing with the Turks will facilitate
to a great extent our subsequent actions for further amendments.
It would then be possible for unilateral amendments to be made,
without any Turkish reaction, because they will know that their
reaction will be weak or seriously harmful for their community.” 13
Some parts of the Akritas plan were omitted in the publication. It is suspected
that these parts included the annihilation plans against the Turkish Cypriot
community.
Under these circumstances Turkey considered all the options to protect
the Turkish community on the island. Initial step was diplomatic. Turkish
president Cemal Gürsel sent a letter to US president Lyndon B. Johnson on
December 25, 1963 and requested him to stop the violence and massacres

11 George W. Ball, The Past Has Another Pattern: Memoirs, (New York: Norton and Company, 1982)
338.
12 The Akritas plan became known to public on April 21, 1966 when it was published in Patris, a right
wing Greek newspaper controlled by the EOKA B leader General Grivas. Since Grivas turned against
Makarios after the 1964 crisis, he had the Akritas plan published to diminish Makarios’ authority in
Cyprus. Çay, 57.
13 For the full text of Akritas plan see, Hakki, 90- 97. The Akritas plan was published as a UN
Document A/33/115, s/12722 of 30 May 1978. Parts of the Akritas plan is available http://www.cyprusconﬂict.net/akritas_plan.html (accessed 11 January 2012).
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against Turkish civilians. 14 On the same day, Turkish jets flew over Cyprus
as a warning to the Cyprus government. In response, Makarios appealed to
the UN to ensure his grip on Cyprus but he was not able to get a protectorate
from the UN.
On December 27, British troops on the island restored order in Nicosia, creating
a line between the Turkish and Greek sides of Nicosia. Later on, Turkey and
Greece joined the British peacekeeping force. The joint peacekeeping force
established a green line between the two sides. This action reduced the
tension in Nicosia but the violence did not end in the countryside.
The representatives of Turkish and Greek Cypriots, Greece, Turkey and
Britain met at the London conference to discuss the issue on January 15,
1964. During the conference, Greek Cypriots insisted that the constitution be
amended, while Turkish Cypriots offered their pre-1960 plan, partition. The
main issue was the security of the Turkish population on the island. Turkey,
Greece, and Britain agreed to a deployment of a NATO peacekeeping force
in Cyprus. Turkish Cypriots accepted this plan but Greek Cypriot leader
Archbishop Makarios refused. Makarios’ refusal to allow the deployment of
a NATO force was motivated by several factors. Makarios’ primary goal was
to amend the Cyprus constitution. A NATO force, which would have protected
the guaranteed treaties, the constitution, and the security of Turks, would not
help him to achieve his goal of enosis. 15 The deployment of NATO forces on
the island would also have provoked a Soviet reaction and strengthened the
political left in Cyprus. Makarios had to consider the upcoming elections in
1965. AKEL, the Cyprus Communist Party, was the most organized party on the
island and it was strongly against NATO existence on the island. Archbishop
Makarios did not mind flirting with AKEL. He kicked Turkish Cypriot deputies
out of the Cyprus parliament and appointed AKEL members in their places.
Makarios, therefore, would only agree to a United Nations peacekeeping force.
Neither Turkey, Greece, Britain, nor the US were initially willing to accept the
UN peacekeeping force because if responsibility for the Cyprus issue were
transferred to the UN, the Soviets would have an opportunity to play a role in
finding a solution. The Soviets had already condemned the attempts of Britain,
Greece, and Turkey to deploy a NATO force on the island. 16 Eventually, it was

14 American Foreign Policy, Current Documents 1963, (Washington: US Government Printing Ofﬁce,
1967) 470.
15 Oberling, Road to Bellapais, 103.
16 Faruk Sönmezoğlu, Taraﬂarın Tutum ve Tezleri Açısından Kıbrıs Sorunu (1945-1986), (Istanbul:
Istanbul Universitesi Yayınları, 1991) 69.
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agreed that a UNFICYP (UN peace keeping force in Cyprus) should take an
active role in Cyprus. However, the UNFICYP could not prevent the continuing
violence in Cyprus either.
Subsequently, the US started playing a major role in the Cyprus issue. The
American approach toward the Cyprus issue was different than that of Britain.
While Britain tried to maintain its own interests in the Middle East using
Cyprus as a military base, the US evaluated the issue as a security problem
at the southern flank of NATO and in the eastern Mediterranean. 17 The Cyprus
problem brought two NATO allies, Turkey and Greece, to the threshold of a
war.
As a result of the crisis, Turkish Cypriots lost their power in the ruling circles
of the Cyprus Republic. Since then, the Greek Cypriot authorities have been
accepted as the legitimate government of Cyprus, although they violated the
Cyprus constitution and the international treaties that founded the Cyprus
Republic. The crisis also separated the previously integrated population. In
order to protect themselves, Turkish Cypriots gathered in a small territory.
Greek scholars claim that the TMT “forced” Turkish Cypriots to separate
themselves from Greek neighborhoods in order to set the foundations for
partition. 18 In reality, the Turks squeezed into a small area consisting of
only 4.96 percent of the island. 19 Thus, the exodus of the Turks cannot be
considered as an integral part towards realizing their partition plan.
Turkey would not accept the ambiguous situation in Cyprus. Turkey’s primary
concern was the security of Turkish Cypriots. Moreover, Cyprus had a
strategic significance for Turkey. Although Turkey and Greece were allies
in NATO, they have never trusted each other. Had Cyprus been controlled
by Greece, Turkey would have been surrounded by Greece from three sides.
Under these political circumstances, and in order to force Makarios to stop
the violence against the Turkish Cypriots on the island, the Turkish parliament
authorized its government on March 16, 1964 to intervene militarily. Despite
this authorization, the Turkish government did not have any intention of using
its intervention right as a guarantor power largely because of lack of military
equipment.
The Turkish parliament hoped that the intervention decision would be a

17 S. Şükrü Gürel, Kıbrıs Tarihi II (1878-1960), (Istanbul: Kaynak Yayınları, 1985) 44-49.
18 Theodore A. Couloumbis, The United States, Greece, and Turkey: The Troubled Alliance, (New York:
Praeger Publishers, 1983) 62.
19 Sabahattin Egeli, 1960 Kıbrıs Cumhuriyeti Nasıl Yıkıldı, (Istanbul: Kastas A.S: 1991) 35.
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warning to stop Makarios to carry on enosis. Instead, Makarios invited
more Greek troops to the island and mobilized the Cypriot Greeks. The new
government in Greece, led by Georgios Papandreu, had both nationalist and
anti-American tendencies. Cooperation between Makarios and Papandreu
brought 10,000 Greek soldiers to Cyprus. According to the Zurich and London
Treaties, Greece was only authorized to have 950 soldiers on the island, while
Turkey was allowed to keep only 650 soldiers. 20
The Johnson Letter and Its Impact
Despite pressures from both the Turkish public and authorization from the
Turkish parliament, the Turkish government was dragging its feet for a
military operation in Cyprus. The Turkish army’s shortcoming could not be
revealed. In May 1964, the Cyprus parliament, whose Turkish members had
been sacked, passed a bill to establish a strong army and purchase heavy
weapons for the Cyprus National Guard. 21 Makarios’ last step forced the
Turkish government to reconsider its decision to intervene in Cyprus. The
mutual demonstration of force brought two NATO allies to the threshold of
a war. The Turkish government decided to intervene in Cyprus on June 7,
1964. Turkish Prime Minister İsmet İnönü informed US President Lyndon B.
Johnson of Turkish plans with a hope that an American involvement would
stop the Greek military movement on the island and make a risky Turkish
military intervention unnecessary. 22

“As İnönü expected, a warning letter from US President Lyndon
B. Johnson on June 5 caused the Turkish government to cancel
its plan. Nevertheless, the negative tone of Johnson letter made
Turkish leaders worry about not only Cyprus but also about the
reliability of NATO and US in Turkey’s security. In his letter to
Turkish Prime Minister İsmet İnönü, Johnson wrote that Turkey
had decided to intervene in Cyprus without consulting the other
guarantor powers. In addition, Johnson warned Turkey that
it might be left alone in a military struggle against the USSR if
Turkey’s actions cause Soviet involvement:
…a military intervention in Cyprus by Turkey could lead to a direct
involvement by the Soviet Union. I hope you will understand that
your NATO Allies have not had a chance to consider whether they
have an obligation to protect Turkey against the Soviet Union if
Turkey takes a step which results in Soviet intervention without

20 Couloumbis, 46.
21 Fahir Armaoğlu, 20. Yüzyıl Siyasi Tarihi (1914-1990), (V.1, Ankara: İş Bankası Yayınları, 1992), 788.
22 Hakki, 97.
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the full consent and understanding of its NATO Allies.” 23
The Johnson letter shocked Turkish authorities because until then the US
had not played a very active role in seeking a solution to the Cyprus problem.
Even on December 15, 1963, the US secretary of state, Dean Rusk, said to
Turkish Foreign Minister Erkin that “[the] US took position that guarantor
powers were the ones which could best resolve the Cyprus problem. [The]
US already had enough problems on its agenda without taking on the Cyprus
dispute.” 24 As Rusk revealed, the US had its own problems in this period and
Cyprus was not considered as a primarily significant problem. The former US
Secretary of State George W. Ball stated that Britain expected US diplomatic
support, but the US was struggling with many problems around the world.
Besides Vietnam, which was the US’ biggest problem at that time, the US
was faced with trouble in Panama and Congo. Also, the chilly relations with
the USSR, because of the Berlin question, and the problems with Indonesia
were on the US agenda. Therefore, the American government watched the
Cyprus crisis from afar until it became a Cold War issue. The rising tensions
between Turkey and Greece were jeopardizing the security of the southern
flank of NATO. In this case, the US felt the necessity to intervene in the issue
diplomatically.
The US, according to Ball, became involved in the Cyprus problem after the
London Conference ended without a solution. In this period, President Johnson
assigned Ball to bring about a solution for the Cyprus problem. Ball asserts
that Duncan Sandy, the British Secretary of State for the Commonwealth and
Colonies, informed Greek Cypriot Foreign Minister Spyros Kyprianou about
the Anglo-American plan for a NATO force. This proposal was refused by
Makarios immediately. Ball implies that had the Cypriot authorities been
approached with a coordinated plan, it would have been more successful. 25
Johnson, despite the pleas from Turkish authorities, reprimanded neither
the Greek government, who sent 10,000 soldiers to the island violating the
London and Zurich agreements it signed, nor the Cyprus government, who
violated both the international treaties and the Cyprus constitution. One of
the most important reasons why Johnson never warned Greece not to violate
the treaties was the heavy influence of the Greek lobby in the United States.
In 1964, many Greek-American organizations worked to gain the support of
US authorities on the side of Greece. Greek-Americans pressured Johnson

23 Ibid., 99. For the full text of the correspondence between Johnson and İnönü see Hakki, 98-100.
24 Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963, V.16, (Washington: US Printing Ofﬁce 1994) 767.
25 Ball, 341.
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by sending telegrams and letters to the White House. President J.F. Kennedy
and later Johnson were worried about Makarios-AKEL collaboration, 26 but
still American policy makers became a victim of one-sided propaganda of the
Greek-American lobby. 27 Turkey’s efforts were, however, limited to diplomacy.
In his response to Johnson, on June 13, 1964, Turkish PM İnönü revealed
his disappointment about the words and content of Johnson’s letter. İnönü
explained that Turkey had always consulted with the US and the guarantor
powers, but no agreement had been reached. İnönü also complained that the
US warned Turkey not to intervene in Cyprus, although intervention is one
of Turkey’s legal rights as a guarantor, but the US never warned the Greek
government, who openly violated the international treaties that Greece itself
had signed. The main issue İnönü mentioned in his letter was the role of
NATO.

“Our understanding is that the North Atlantic Treaty imposes
upon all member states the obligation to come forthwith to the
assistance of any member victim of an aggression. The only point
left to the discretion of the member states is the nature and the
scale of this assistance. If NATO members should start discussing
the right and wrong of the situation of their fellow-member victim
of a Soviet aggression, whether this aggression was provoked
or not and if the decision on whether they have an obligation to
assist the member should be made to depend on the issue of such
a discussion, the very foundations of the Alliance would be shaken
and it would lose its meaning. An obligation of assistance, if it is
to carry any weight, should come into being immediately upon the
observance of aggression.” 28
İnönü’s visit to the US on June 22-23 gave hope that relations could be
mended. The US spent more efforts to bring a solution to Cyprus. Former
US Secretary of State Dean Acheson submitted a proposal to Turkey and
Greece. According to Acheson’s plan, Turks would get local autonomy in the
predominantly Turkish areas. In other parts of the island, they would be given
minority rights. Also, Turkey would have a military base in northern Cyprus.
The rest of the island would be left to Greece. Greek delegates objected to

26 Suha Bolukbası, Turkish-American Relations and Cyprus, (New York: University Press of America,
1988), 54.
27 For a detailed account of Greek lobbying see Jacob M. Landau, Johnson’s 1964 Letter to İnönü and
Greek Lobbying of the White House, (Jerusalem: Hebrew University, 1979).
28 Halil Ibrahim Salih, Cyprus: The Impact of Diverse Nationalism on a State, (Alabama: The University
of Alabama Press, 1978), 150.
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this plan; instead, they offered a smaller portion for the Turks and the Turkish
military base would remain only for 25 years.
While the negotiations were going on in Geneva, Greek Cypriot forces attacked
Turkish villages on August 6, 1964. As soon as Makarios learned about
Acheson’s proposal, he moved to sabotage negotiations. Had the Acheson
plan been accepted, Makarios would have lost his presidency in Cyprus. The
area that Greek Cypriots invaded was a strategic location through which TMT,
the Turkish Resistance Organization, could get aid from Turkey. Thus, this
time Turkish reaction was harsher. Turkey first demanded that the Greek
Cypriot forces end the invasion of land that TMT controlled. Once it was not
done, Turkish jets bombed the Greek military bases in Cyprus. The US’ silence
during Turkey’s bombing campaign put political pressure on Makarios. The
Turkish bombing campaign did not cause a negative US reaction, even though
Turkey used US made jets and supplies. The first Greek demand for an arms
embargo against Turkey started after Turkey’s strike, 29 but the US did not
want to add fuel to the fire. The US relations with Turkey were already tense
because of the Johnson letter. It seems that the US authorities understood
Turkey’s sentiment; thus, they did not want to pressure Turkey once more.
Despite the Makarios’ sabotage attempt, the negotiations in Geneva carried
on. Acheson prepared a second proposal. He offered Turkey a military base in
Cyprus for 50 years. In fact, the Greek delegation’s main objection was against
giving local autonomy to Turkish Cypriots. Neither Makarios nor Greece was
willing to give any autonomy to Turks. Also, Turkey wanted a larger portion of
land for the military base than Greece would accept.
Turkish negotiator Nihat Erim claimed that Acheson told him and his military
consultant Turgut Sunalp that if Turkey invades the territory, as proposed
in the first proposal, the US would not interfere. When Erim passed the
message to İnönü, İnönü demanded a formal written promise. 30 The formal
promise never came and the Geneva Conference ended without a solution. As
a result of the 1963-64 crises, the constitutional authority of Cyprus Republic
collapsed. Makarios illegitimately controlled the Cyprus Republic. Turkish
deputies were kicked out of the Cyprus parliament. Previously mixed Turkish
and Greek Cypriot communities were separated. The impact of the crisis on
Turkish-American relations escalated even further.

29 Suha Bolukbasioglu, The United States-Turkey Inﬂuence Relationship during the Cyprus Crises,
Unpublished Dissertation, (University of Virginia: 1987), 158.
30 Ibid., 148-149.
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The Impact of Johnson Letter and the Rise of Anti-Americanism
The unsuccessful result of the Geneva Conference crushed Turkey’s hopes
of a peaceful resolution to the Cyprus problem. Turkish frustration turned
into anti-American demonstrations. İnönü’s Cyprus adviser, Nihat Erim, who
later became Turkish Prime Minister in 1971, said that “until then there was
only one country in the world [Turkey], in which Americans were never told
to ‘Go home’ ”. 31 The Johnson letter incident changed that. The Turkish left
was successful at exploiting the problem for its own gains. Since President
Johnson openly opposed Turkish military intervention, the primary target of
Turkish media and demonstrations was the US instead of Greece or Greek
Cypriot leader Makarios.
The point in Johnson’s letter regarding NATO’s position worried Turkey.
Turkey joined NATO only to protect itself from the Soviet threat but Johnson
made clear that if Turkey provokes the Soviets, NATO would not defend
Turkey against a Soviet attack. Johnson’s approach to NATO’s role brought
the reliability of NATO and the US into question in Turkey. The US and NATO
were declared unreliable and untrustworthy. Anti-American demonstrations
intensified in August 1964. Demonstrators included many Turkish military
officers including Cemal Tural, the Commander of the Turkish Ground Forces.
Protestors shouted “Down with America”. 32
After the demonstrations, the US declared that the US would come to Turkey’s
aid in case of an attack by the Soviets, even if the attack happens while Turkey
acts on its right to intervene in Cyprus 33 but this statement changed nothing.
Although the Turkish government had no serious intention to intervene in
Cyprus, the Turkish public was convinced that the US prevented Turkey from
saving Turkish Cypriots. Furthermore, American policy makers reconsidered
US Cyprus policy after the crisis by setting two basic principles in approaching
the problem. Primarily, the struggle between the Greek and Turkish Cypriots
should not cause a war between Greece and Turkey. Secondly, the Cyprus
conflict should not jeopardize US relations with Greece or Turkey. 34 This shift
and policy reevaluation was too late. Anti-Americanism was already widely
spread in Turkey.

31 Armaoğlu, 20.yy…, 790.
32 Bolukbasi, 154.
33 George S. Harris, Troubled Alliance: Turkish-American Problems in Historical Perspective, 19451971, (Washington D.C.: Hoover Policy Study, 1972) 120.
34 Thomas W. Adams & Alvin J. Cottrell, Cyprus Between East and West, (Baltimore: The John Hopkins
Press, 1968) 69.
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Former US Secretary of State George W. Ball regarded Johnson’s letter as
“the diplomatic equivalent of an atomic bomb”. 35 In fact, the magnitude of
the impact on Turkish politics was equivalent to the impact of an atomic
bomb. Johnson’s letter had shaken the roots of Turkish domestic politics
and changed the Turkish political fault lines. Previously the dominant Turkish
political groups were mainly defined as two groups: the Turkish militaryjudiciary bureaucracy and the Republican Public Party (RPP) have traditionally
declared themselves as the guardians of progressive Kemalism and framed
the rest either as religious or communist reactionaries. The Johnson letter
incident destroyed this traditional progressive-reactionary frame by forcing
Turkish politicians to seek alternatives to US.
In less than a month after the Johnson letter incident İsmet İnönü’s government
barely survived a vote of confidence in the Turkish parliament in June 1964. 36
Seasoned politician İnönü, who had served in many state posts including
presidency and prime ministry, did not have a clean record dealing with
Turkey’s socialists. He had previously exiled or jailed socialist intellectuals.
Nevertheless, he now did not hesitate to tilt the RPP to the left. The RPP,
the first political party of the Turkish Republic, had previously did not identify
itself either as a left wing or a right wing party but only as a Kemalist party. A
month later İnönü declared the RPP as a ‘left of center’ party. This new policy
was basically a soft socialism. İnönü’s new adviser Bülent Ecevit had socialist
leanings. The RPP entered the 1965 elections with a new executive committee
dominated by socialists. This step was perhaps one of the strongest warnings
to the US. Turkey’s flagship party was becoming socialist. As the party turned
to the left, the conservative wing of RPP, led by Turhan Feyzioğlu left the RPP
leaving the party mainly to socialists.
Despite the public protests, the main opposition, the center right Justice
Party (JP), did not openly target the US. Instead the JP blamed İnönü for the
diplomatic failure. The JP leader Saadettin Bilgiç stated that the US had to
prevent the breakout of a war between Greece and Turkey. In order to do that
the US had to give the political pressure on the country that cared most about
the US. 37 His soft message was certainly noted by the US policy makers.
The RPP’s new ‘left of center’ policy did not help the party in elections.
The JP won both the 1965 and the 1969 elections. Despite the victories of
the conservatives in the elections, socialists broadened their influence in

35 Ball, 350.
36 Harris, 116.
37 Bolukbasi, 153.
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intellectual circles. Turkish intellectuals with diverse political views all
agreed that Turkey should not rely on the US anymore. While the conservatives
proposed closer ties with the Islamic countries, the socialists proposed Turkey
to leave NATO and join the non-alignment pact. Indeed, this was a strategic
move. The majority of socialists desired for the improvement of TurkishSoviet relations. 38
In the mid-1960s, socialist ideas spread among university students,
professors, and labor union members. Using the Johnson letter as a base
of criticism, the Turkish media, which was overwhelmingly controlled by
socialists, demanded Turkey’s withdrawal from NATO. The demands in the
media turned into an anti-American student movement in the universities.
The socialists organized into the Turkish Labor Party (TLP). The TLP could
not get a large sum of vote in the elections but its socialist voice was strong
in the media. The protests in some occasions turned into leftist activism and
by the late 1960s, Turkey witnessed political violations. The rise of political
tensions and violence across Turkey led to a military coup in Turkey in 1971.
After socialist TLP was shut down in 1971, socialists found refuge in the RPP,
pushing it further to the left. In the 1972 congress, Bülent Ecevit defeated the
legendary party leader İsmet İnönü and socialists eventually gained the total
control of the RPP.
The Turkish government’s policy changes also encouraged the socialists.
Because of chilly relations with the US, the new conservative JP government
did not hesitate to flirt with the USSR after the 1963-64 crisis. Turkish and
Soviet parliamentary delegations exchanged visits after 1964. Furthermore,
the Turkish government revised its 54 military treaties with the US. The 1969
treaty replaced all previous 54 treaties and it restricted the US military and
personnel activities in Turkey. 39 During the Lebanon crisis in 1958, the US had
used its military bases in Turkey. 40 After 1965, the US was no longer allowed
to use its bases for non-NATO purposes. During the Arab-Israeli war of 1967
and the Lebanon crisis of 1969, the Turkish government did not allow the use
of American bases in Turkey. 41
New Policy Formations
After the 1963-64 crises, Turkey proposed a federal state in Cyprus. Turkey’s

38 Ibid., 154.
39 Fahir Armaoğlu, Belgelerle Türk-Amerikan Münasebetleri, (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları,
1991), 277-285.
40 Harris, 66-68.
41 Ibid., 166.
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new proposal attracted the Soviet support in the UN in December 1964. 42 The
Soviets did not miss any opportunity to pull Turkey to their side. Nevertheless,
the Soviets still supported Makarios’ proposal to cancel the guarantee treaties
that authorized Britain, Greece and Turkey to intervene in Cyprus. The main
Soviet goal was to prevent the NATO control of Cyprus. Thus, the Soviets
supported the independence of the non-aligned Cyprus Republic. The Soviets
were against enosis, which would have given the control of island to Greece
and taksim, the initial Turkish plan to divide the island between Turkey and
Greece. A federal Cyprus state without guarantee treaties was acceptable to
the Soviets.
The Turkish government was not the only side that sought the Soviet support.
Greek Cypriot leader Makarios did what he could to keep the Communist Party
of Cyprus AKEL happy and at bay 43 so that he could attract the Soviet support.
AKEL was the sole organized party in Cyprus until 1969. Makarios rewarded
communists with five seats in the parliament after he had kicked out Turkish
parliament members. 44 In order to keep communists at bay Makarios had to
abandon or postpone his enosis goal. Following the communist strategy of
Soviets, AKEL was against enosis. It favored an independent Cyprus. Thus,
when the Soviets supported the Turkish federation proposal for Cyprus, AKEL
had a hard time on the island. Eventually, AKEL declared its objection to the
federal state proposal. 45
Nevertheless, Cyprus policy of Greece remained the same. Greece was
afraid that the full independence of Cyprus would cause the abandonment
of enosis. The US was also concerned that full independence would prevent
the NATO control of Cyprus. The Acheson plan, therefore, suggested Turkey’s
taksim thesis together with Greece’s enosis plan but it did not suggest the
independence of Cyprus.
The 1967 Crisis
After the 1963-64 crises, Greece had to deal with the political instability as
well. Greek Prime Minister Georgios Papandreu’s visit to the US at the same
time as Turkish Prime Minister’s visit in June 1964 did not result in a solution
to the Cyprus issue. As soon as Papandreu returned to Greece, he publicly
declared that he was proud of rejecting American political pressure. In less

42 Ömer Taşlı, Ortadoğu’ya Süper Güçlerin Etkileri, (Istanbul: Fikir Yayınları, 1991) 93.
43 Thomas W. Adams, AKEL: The Communist Party of Cyprus, (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press,
1971) 5-7.
44 Adams, & Cottrell, 23-24.
45 Sönmezoğlu, 69.
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than a month, on July 15, 1964 King Konstantin II removed Papandreu from
power. A provisional government was set to carry the country to the elections
on May 28, 1967. Papandreu was expected to win the elections but a military
coup on April 21 by Colonel George Papadopoulos halted the democracy in
Greece. Apparently, the US played a significant role in both the dismissal of
Papandreu 46 and making of the military coup. 47
Not surprisingly, the colonel’s junta took a strong pro-American position in
foreign policy. One of the major goals of junta was to bring Cyprus to Greek
control by reaching enosis. The junta increased its support to pro-enosis
groups in Cyprus. Eventually, the Cyprus National Guard led by General
Grivas, who was sent by Greece, attacked some Turkish villages on November
15, 1967.
Turkey’s determined stance and decision to intervene militarily in Cyprus
ended this crisis shortly before it escalated into a war. Turkey first warned
Greece 48 and asked Greece that unless the Turkish demands are satisfied a
military intervention was inevitable. Turkey demanded the demobilization of
20,000 men in the Greek National Guard, the removal of 12,000 Greek soldiers
and General Grivas from Cyprus, and the removal of the Greek National Guard
from the area it invaded. President Johnson appointed the former Deputy
of the Defense Secretary Cyrus Vance for mediation. The US diplomatically
made it clear that it had no intention to stop Turkish intervention by military
force. 49 In this case, Greece had two options: to defend Cyprus or to accept
Turkey’s conditions. Greece chose the second one. Turkey’s conditions were
carried out by Greece and the 1967 crisis did not turn into a war.
From the 1963-64 crises to 1968, the Greek Cypriot Government considered
Turks as “insurgents” and did not engage in negotiations. In 1968, after the
Greek troops left the island, Makarios agreed to join bilateral negotiations
with Turkish Cypriots. Secret negotiations took place in Beirut from June
1968 to October 1971. During the negotiations, Turkish Cypriot representative

46 Couloumbis, 49.
47 Ibid., 50-51. Also, for the detailed information about the US role in the coup see Laurance Stern,
The Wrong Horse: The Politics of Intervention and the Failure of American Diplomacy, (New York: Times
Books, 1977), 41-51.
48 Although many scholars write that Turkey sent a note to Greece, it was later clariﬁed that Turkey
did not send a written note, instead Turkish Foreign Minister İhsan Sabri Çağlayangil orally informed the
Greek ambassador about Turkey’s conditions to cancel the military intervention. Özer Eskiyurt, Erdoğan
Teziç, Murat Sarıca, Kıbrıs Sorunu, (Istanbul: Istanbul Universitesi Yayınları, 1975) 144-145.
49 Adams and Cottrell, 71.
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Rauf Denktaş focused on two points: equal political rights for Turks and the
continuation of Turkey’s guarantor status. Makarios, however, offered only
minority rights to Turkish Cypriots. 50
Makarios did not have friendly relations with the Greek colonel’s junta, either.
The junta regarded Makarios as a big obstacle in front of enosis. The junta
sponsored a terrorist organization in Cyprus, Aspida, to get rid of Makarios.
Aspida several times attempted assassinations of Makarios but each time
Makarios managed to escape. Makarios’ relations with the Greek junta
became chilly after an assassination attempt against Makarios on March 8,
1970. His only supporter was the Soviets so Makarios visited Moscow in the
spring of 1971. 51 His visit, undoubtedly, angered the pro-American Greek junta
more.
Greece responded to Makarios’ actions by secretly sending General Grivas,
the former leader of the Cyprus National Guard, back to Cyprus in September
1971. 52 Grivas founded the EOKA-B, an anti-Makarios terrorist organization
in Cyprus. This was the junta’s second attempt to get rid of Makarios so
that enosis could be reached. EOKA-B had the same intentions as Aspida
had had. EOKA-B arranged a terrorist campaign against Cyprus government
authorities. 53 Despite these attacks, Makarios was still strong in Cyprus in
the early 1970s.
While Greece was struggling under the rule of colonel’s junta, Turkey was
dealing with its domestic problems in the late 1960s. The Turkish army staged
a coup by forcing the elected government of Prime Minister Süleyman Demirel
to resign on March 12, 1971. A provisional government then controlled Turkey
until the elections in October 1973. After the elections a strange coalition
government of the leftist RPP the Political Islamic NSP (National Salvation
Party) was established. The RPP and the NSP had different policies toward
Cyprus. While the RPP defended the federal solution, the latter insisted on
taksim, partition. The RPP leader and new Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit, and
the Vice PM, the NSP leader, Necmettin Erbakan, both took an explicit antiAmerican stance. The coalition government’s decision to rescind the poppy
cultivation ban on July 1, 1974 increased the tension between Turkey and the
US. Since the previous government’s decision was made under US pressure,
the new government viewed the issue as a question of self-determination.

50 Rauf R. Denktaş, Kıbrıs Davamız, (Ankara: Koksav, 1991) 8-9.
51 P.N. Vanezis, Cyprus: The Unﬁnished Agony, (London: Abelard-Schuman, 1977) 45.
52 Ibid., 49.
53 Çay, 90-92.
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New developments in Cyprus now brought the attention of the US back to
Cyprus.
The 1974 Crisis
The sudden death of General Grivas in January 1974 changed the rules
of political game in Cyprus. Makarios used this opportunity to finish off
EOKA-B. He first declared EOKA-B illegal then asked Greece to withdraw its
650 Greek army officers from the Cyprus National Guard. 54 The Greek junta
had a new leader. In November 1973 General Dimitios Ioannidis ended the
rule of George Papadopoulos with a military coup. The hardliner Ioannidis
responded Makarios militarily. The Greek officers in the Cyprus National
Guard overthrew Makarios government on July 15, 1974. Makarios barely
escaped to London. The coup plotters declared a new state: the “Hellenic
Republic of Cyprus.” In order to legitimize their position, the coup leaders
had to find a Greek Cypriot for their new state’s presidency. Eventually, they
found Nikos Sampson, whose political slogan was “Death to the Turks” when
he was elected to the Greek House of Representatives in 1969. 55
On July 16, the Turkish government invited Britain to participate in a joint
military operation in Cyprus. The next day, the Turkish Prime Minister Bülent
Ecevit visited London to talk about the issue. Britain was not willing to use its
right to intervene but declared Makarios as the only legitimate president of
Cyprus. 56 Primary goal of Britain and the US was to prevent a military conflict
between Greece and Turkey. The US also had its own agenda: it was the last
phase of the Watergate crisis in the US and President Nixon was planning his
resignation from office. Thus, Turkey prepared for a unilateral military action.
American diplomats worked hard to prevent Turkey’s military intervention.
Joseph Sisco, the Deputy Secretary of State, visited London, Ankara, and
Athens. He brought a letter from President Nixon to Turkish President Fahri
Korutürk. In his letter, Nixon openly warned that should Turkey start a military
operation it might result in an American arms embargo against Turkey. Unlike
the Johnson letter, the Nixon letter was clear and diplomatic. The earlier
poppy cultivation decision of Turkish coalition government indicated that
the Turkish government would carry on as it desired to protect the Turkish
interests. Indeed, the US policy makers were aware of Greece’s coup plans
and did nothing to prevent it. In June 1974, William Fulbright, the chairman
of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, warned Secretary of State Henry
Kissinger about Greece’s plan for a coup. Kissinger told him that “the US

54 Pierre Oberling, Kıbrıs Faciası, (Ankara: Turk Tarih Kurumu Yay., 1990) 16-17.
55 Oberling, The Road to…, 160.
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should not interfere in the internal affairs of the Greeks”. 57 Kissinger already
considered Cyprus as part of Greece. Thus, the US policy was designed to stop
Turkey.
Sisco carried Turkey’s conditions to Greece. Turkey demanded the resignation
of Nikos Sampson and the removal of the 650 Greek officers from the Cyprus
National Guard. Greece, however, did not even admit to having played a role in
the coup. When diplomacy did not work Turkey decided to carry on a unilateral
military intervention to prevent the annexation of Cyprus to Greece and to
provide security for Turkish Cypriots.
Turkey launched its attack on July 20, 1974. This time Turkey was not alone.
The communist bloc, which was against a total NATO control on Cyprus,
strategically supported Turkey. Yugoslavia and Bulgaria deployed troops on
their borders with Greece. 58 Under this military pressure on its borders, the
Greek junta could not initiate an attack against mainland Turkey. On July 22,
Turkey achieved its goal and Nikos Sampson left the island. On the same
day, conservative leader Constantine Karamanlis overthrew the Greek junta
in Greece. The US could not prevent the Turkish intervention but under large
diplomatic pressure Turkey was forced to declare a militarily premature
cease-fire. The US warned Turkey it may pull back its nuclear weapons from
Turkey had Turkey engage in a war against Greece. 59 The main political goal
of the military operation was achieved so quickly that by the time cease-fire
was announced the Turkish army controlled only seven percent of the island. 60
In case of a Greek attack, Turkish forces would not be able to defend their
position in such a small area.
The peace negotiations were scheduled for July 25 in Geneva. At the first
Geneva Conference, Greece and Turkey agreed that the Greek National Guard
would end the invasion of Turkish populated areas and in exchange the Greek
National Guard could be allowed to expand the area it controlled. On August 9,
1974 Greek and Turkish representatives met in the second Geneva Conference
but there was no progress. Turkey was not satisfied with Greece’s delaying
tactics and launched the second offensive on August 14. During the second
offensive campaign, the Turkish army was able to control 37 percent of the
island. Turkey’s second operation met with a worldwide criticism and was
considered internationally as an invasion, whereas the first one was viewed
as the legitimate right of Turkey.

57 Bolukbasi, 272.
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On the day of the second Turkish offensive, Greece declared its withdrawal
from NATO. Despite its support for Turkey in the first operation, the USSR
suddenly turned against Turkey after the Greek decision to leave NATO. 61 The
1974 crisis certainly brought many satisfactory results for the communist bloc.
The pro-American Greek junta fell, a possible total NATO control of Cyprus
was averted and Greece pulled out of NATO. As if the Greek government’s
decision to leave NATO was not enough to crumble the southern flank of
NATO, the US initiated an awkward arms embargo against its other NATO ally
because Turkey used American weapons during the Cyprus operation despite
earlier American warnings. According to the military aid treaties between
Turkey and the US, Turkey was supposed to use American weapons only for
security purposes. The Cyprus crisis was seen by Turkey as a security issue.
The lives of Turks on the island were threatened. The control of the island by
Greece would have threatened the security of the Turkish mainland because
by controlling Cyprus, Greece would surround Turkey from the south, west,
and north.
American arms embargo, which started on February 5, 1975, further alienated
Turkey. Turkey’s immediate reaction was the declaration of Turkish Federated
State of Cyprus (TFSC) in the Turkish controlled northern Cyprus on February
13. Turkey was still pursuing a federal solution in Cyprus. Once President
Gerald Ford’s political attempt to end the arms embargo failed Turkey took a
step to cancel its 1969 Defense Cooperation Agreement with the US in July.
The Turkish decision allowed only NATO related duties of American military
in Turkey. All other military bases were controlled by the Turkish army. 62 The
Soviets finally reached their goal of achieving the collapse of the southern
flank of NATO. The self-inflicted wounds of NATO took some time to heal.
Eventually, the US arms embargo was removed in September 1978 but no new
military treaty was signed with Turkey until March 1980.

61 Armaoğlu, 20.yy…,805-807.
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Conclusion
From 1960 to 1975, three major crises erupted in Cyprus: the 1964, the 1967
and the 1974 crises. Ironically, although the major actors of the problem,
Britain, Greece, Turkey and the US as well as Greek and Turkish Cypriots were
largely pro-West, the real winner out of this fiasco was the Soviet Union. The
Soviets’ indirect involvement on the problem through their local voice Cyprus
Communist Party (AKEL) proved a lot more productive by 1975. The Soviets
avoided getting a direct negative reaction from the public in Greece, Turkey
and Cyprus while the US became a target of demonstrations in both Turkey
and Greece. The Soviets had a clear and solid Cyprus policy. They wanted an
independent Cyprus state without NATO influence on it.
Furthermore, although US traditionally presented itself as the defender of
democracy and freedom of expression, American political decisions made
in this period contradicted this traditional belief. American administrations
worked closely with authoritarian military regimes and bypassed the voice of
people with top-to-down decisions, in Turkey and Greece while the Soviets
and their communist outlets voiced their opinions through media, grassroots
organizations or political parties. Not surprisingly the democratic steps
of authoritarian communists prevailed over the authoritarian practices of
democrats.
After 1960, Britain preferred to remain on the side and expected US to
intervene diplomatically. British and American policy goal on Cyprus was not
different. Both aimed to put the island under NATO control, either through
partition between Greece and Turkey or through the annexation of the island
by Turkey or Greece. The first option, partition, was opposed by Greece. The
second option, annexation, brought about the question of whether Greece or
Turkey should control the island. The influence of a strong Greek lobby in
the US and the pro-US Greek junta’s faithfulness to the US, brought the US
policy makers to the side of Greece. The annexation of the island by Greece
could have ended the communist influence in Cyprus, but Turkey’s threat to
intervene and the Cypriot leader Makarios’ determination to keep Cyprus as
an independent state were serious obstacles in front of that goal.
American policy makers’ attempts to provide a peaceful solution to the
problem by trying to satisfy both parties simultaneously only served to
undermine its credibility as an ally to either side. In the post-Johnson letter
incident Turkey’s consequential reevaluation of its foreign policy damaged US
interests because Turkey now looked to the Soviet Union for support. Turkey
was able to obtain Soviet support in both the 1967 and 1974 crises. The US
reevaluated its Cyprus policy after 1964. When Turkey bombed the Greek
National Guard’s bases with US-made jets and supplies in 1967, the US did
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not show the same reaction as it did in 1964. This in turn angered Greece.
Turkey’s post-1964 federal state proposal would have created two separate
states run by one center but neither the US nor Greece was willing to accept
an independent Cyprus state. Greece proposed no solution other than enosis.
Pro-American Greek military junta targeted Makarios because he became an
obstacle in front of enosis and cooperated with the communists on the island.
From the American policy-makers’ point of view, once Cyprus was freed from
Makarios, Turkey had to be stopped through negotiations. The last step of
the plan did not work because in 1974 Turkey intervened militarily. At the end
of the 1974 crisis, the Greek junta fell and Greece left NATO. The US put an
arms embargo on Turkey and in response Turkey shut down the US military
bases in Turkey, except one. In an attempt to keep both Turkey and Greece
peacefully in NATO, the US almost lost them both creating instability in the
southern flank of NATO.
The previously mixed Turkish and Greek neighborhoods of Cyprus divided up
after 1964. The Turkish military intervention brought thirty seven percent
of island under Turkish control. From 1955 to present for over sixty years
Turkey, US, Britain, Soviet Union and later Russia along with the Greek and
Turkish Cypriots and United Nations developed various policy proposals on
Cyprus. Greece remained as the only side that consistently kept one policy
goal, enosis. This goal was partially achieved as Cyprus joined the European
Union in 2004 alas without the Turkish side on the north.
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